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Abstract The know-your-customer (KYC) due diligence
process is outdated and generates costs of up to USD 500
million per year per bank. The authors propose a new
system, based on distributed ledger technology (DLT), that
reduces the costs of the core KYC verification process for
financial institutions and improves the customer experi-
ence. In the proposed system, the core KYC verification
process is only conducted once for each customer,
regardless of the number of financial institutions with
which that customer intends to work. Thanks to DLT, the
result of the core KYC verification can be securely shared
by customers with all the financial institutions that they
intend to work with. This system allows for efficiency
gains, cost reduction, improved customer experience, and
increased transparency throughout the process of
onboarding a customer.
Keywords Blockchain  Know your customer  Banking
1 Introduction
The increased regulatory cost incurred due to the know-
your-customer (KYC) verification process in banking is
one of the largest challenges that the banking sector is
currently experiencing. The yearly direct costs that finan-
cial institutions need to cover in order to meet their obli-
gations in terms of KYC are estimated, in a recent survey
by Thompson Reuters (2016), to average USD 60 million.1
This cost can be further augmented by the fines levied on
financial institutions due to their misconduct with regard to
anti-money-laundering (AML) and KYC regulations.
According to the head of Strategy and Risk at the Hong
Kong Securities and Futures Commission, ‘‘KYC and
AML stand out [for a bank to] as a pretty significant
inefficiency and problem case [...] tallying up the fines [for
a bank to] 10 billion or more US dollars’’ (Benedict N.
Nolens, at the MIT Technology Review Emtech confer-
ence, 2016). And the sources of additional costs do not stop
here, as financial institutions are not allowed to conduct
any business with corporate entities that have not yet
completed the full KYC process. Since that process is long,
and tends to lengthen with the size of the corporate entity
concerned, the starting point of a given business relation-
ship between a customer and a financial institution is
usually delayed, which represents opportunity costs for
both parties. Indeed, corporations need to verify all their
subsidiaries before being granted KYC verification, and
this is a laborious task for them. Therefore, it comes as
little surprise that the abovementioned survey indicates that
89% of customers do not have a good KYC experience.
The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to the
KYC verification process. We introduce a system, based on
DLT, that proposes a solution to the increased costs of the
KYC process and the lack of customer satisfaction. The key
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reason for using DLT is that it allows us to observe the KYC
cost structure at an aggregate level for all the financial
institutions operating in a jurisdiction and to tackle the
inefficiencies that emerge from the duplicated conduct of
similar tasks by all participating institutions (i.e., DLT
allows us to render the execution of duplicated tasks com-
pletely unnecessary, and this delivers far greater cost sav-
ings than would any effort to merely make these duplicated
tasks more cost efficient). Specifically, DLT enables the
creation of a chronological, decentralized, interbank ledger
in which financial institutions that need to conduct the same
KYC verification tasks for that customer can verify the
result of the process that has already been conducted for that
customer, thus avoiding conducting duplicated KYC veri-
fication tasks. Moreover, the use of DLT allows the cost of
the KYC process to be shared proportionally among the
financial institutions that work with a specific customer. In
particular, the system allows customers to carry out the full
KYC process with only one financial institution, and later
on to share the result of that KYC process with any other
financial institution that they intend to work with. The DLT
acts as a ‘‘single point of truth’’, understood as the only
source of information, accepted by any involved party
should conflict occur.
The main improvement of the proposed system over the
current system is that the KYC process only needs to be
carried out once by each customer, rather than once by each
institution working with that customer. This reduces the
aggregated cost of the KYC process as a whole in a juris-
diction without compromising the security of the system,
respects the privacy of the participants, and increases trans-
parency in case of a conflict. Additionally, the use of the
public key of a customer as a reference point for an
immutable exchange of information across participating
institutions serves as a basis for interbank collaboration. The
use of DLT reduces the aggregate cost of KYC and this is the
main conceptual contribution of this paper. In Sect. 2 we
explain theKYCprocess, and relate it towork that has already
been carried out with regard to optimizing KYC costs. Sec-
tion 3 offers an overview of DLT and examines its potential
for resolving the current problems of the KYC process. In
Sect. 4we showhowwe have applied design science research
to solve the problem at hand. In Sect. 5 we describe and
analyze the prototype solution and the economic mechanisms
that need to be put in place in order to ensure a well func-
tioning system. In Sect. 6 we discuss three possible imple-
mentations of this solution. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Current KYC Process
The KYC process is part of the growing regulation of the
financial industry that began with the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 (see USA 1986) and has been growing
extensively since in the form of further, ongoing regulation
aimed at precluding either money laundering or the funding
of terrorist activity (see USA
1988, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2004). Financial institutions
are obliged by regulators to onboard their customers before
conducting any activity with them, in order to avoid
working with customers that pursue either of the afore-
mentioned illicit activities. The KYC process consists of an
exchange of documents between the customer and the
financial institution that intend to work together. The pro-
cess includes the collection of basic identity information
from all beneficiaries to check for illicit activity and ‘‘po-
litically exposed persons.’’2 The process also includes risk
management with regard to onboarding new customers, the
monitoring of transactions, and specific customer policies
for banks. The process is costly for financial institutions
and may expose them to large fines if it is not conducted in
accordance with the existing regulations [e.g., HSBC was
fined USD 1.92 billion when it was discovered that Mex-
ico’s Sinaloa cartel and Colombia’s Norte del Valle cartel
had laundered USD 881 million through the bank (Vis-
wanatha and Wolf 2012), and ING Bank paid USD 619
million in fines for violating sanctions against a variety of
countries (Freifeld 2012)].
The KYC process is initiated when a customer intends to
work with a financial institution. Chronologically, the
customer and the financial institution agree on the terms of
a relationship. Then, the customer sends the required
documents to the financial institution in order to enable the
institution to conduct the KYC verification process. The
financial institution analyzes the documents and generates
an additional, internal document that serves as the certifi-
cation that assures regulators that this customer has been
either validated or rejected and that the KYC process has
been properly conducted. This process is repeated every
time the customer intends to work with a new financial
institution. In the current setting, every time a customer
initiates a relationship with a financial institution the costs
of the KYC verification process recur. Figure 1 shows an
example case that illustrates the process that occurs when a
customer intends to work with three different financial
institutions. This example case shows how, for this single
customer, the exchange of documents and the core KYC
validation must be undertaken three times, such that the
total costs that are generated by this customer are three
times those of a single KYC process. At this point, it is
2 Broadly speaking, a ‘‘politically exposed person’’ is one who has
been entrusted with either a prominent public function or a prominent
function in a state-owned enterprise or international organization,
either at home or abroad. Such individuals must be identified during
the process given their particular ability to exert considerable
influence.
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important to differentiate between the ‘‘core KYC verifi-
cation process’’, which is the minimum KYC verification
that all financial institutions are obliged by law to conduct,
and additional, bank-specific processes. While further
documentation can be asked for by each financial institu-
tion to create an ‘‘additional aura of information’’ for every
customer, our solution focuses solely on the core KYC
verification process, which is that shared by all the finan-
cial institutions in a jurisdiction.
The growth of regulation and changes to technology, as
well as the financial crisis of 2007, have created opportu-
nities for companies, working in a field referred to as
‘‘regtech’’, that aim to use technology to improve the
implementation of regulations. The term ‘‘regtech’’ comes
from the combination of the words ‘‘regulation’’ and
‘‘technology’’. These opportunities are especially signifi-
cant within the domain of KYC (see Memminger et al.
2016; Arner et al. 2016). Arasa and Ottichilo (2015) con-
duct an analysis of the cost of KYC based on the com-
plexity level of the compliance required for the case of
commercial banks in Kenya, establishing four variables
that explain 78.3% of the compliance requirements. Soni
and Duggal (2014) look into using big data analytics to
reduce risk for institutions conducting the KYC process.
Colladon and Remondi (2017) work on different approa-
ches to using cluster analysis over a network of customers
and potential customers to identify suspicious financial
operations and potentially criminal activities. They do so
by mapping relational data and using predictive models
over an internal transactions database involving data from
over 33,000 financial operations. A survey of the latest
regulatory requirements and a history of KYC and AML
processes can be found in Ruce (2011). KYC can be
improved by, for example, improving auditors’ effective-
ness in assessing KYC and AML practices. A case study in
the context of Luxemburg is provided by Smet and Men-
tion (2011) and reveals that audit effectiveness could be
increased and information asymmetries reduced by an ISO
standard for an internal control assessment model for KYC.
The current paper aims to deliver an additional improve-
ment by using DLT to reduce the aggregate cost of the
KYC process and distribute these lower costs proportion-
ally among the financial institutions participating in the
system. Tackling the cost of the KYC process from the
aggregated perspective (i.e., as the sum of the individual
costs of each financial institution) and using DLT to reduce
this aggregate cost is the main contribution of this paper.
3 Blockchain Technology
DLT, such as blockchain technology, has gained promi-
nence thanks to the widespread use of the cryptocurrency
Bitcoin. Bitcoin, introduced by Nakamoto (2008), was the
first working cryptocurrency that was not owned by a
central authority. While DLT was originally used to pro-
vide a new way of creating money and transferring it via
the Internet, the technology can also be used to run and
govern decentralized systems by means of smart contracts.
Smart contracts are computer protocols that facilitate,
verify, or enforce predefined clauses whenever a set of
conditions is given. As described by Szabo (1997), the
intention of using smart contracts is to embed them in a
whole range of properties that are valuable and controlled
by digital means. Since Nakamoto’s seminal work (Naka-
moto 2008), new instances that propose the use of DLT for
a range of novel purposes have emerged. One of these is
‘‘Ethereum’’, which is a platform upon which whole
decentralized applications may be run (see Wood 2016).
Many papers, including Peters and Panayi (2015) and
Harvey (2016) discuss the blockchain from a technical
perspective.
While transactions in the Bitcoin blockchain can include
small scripts that define output spending conditions, such
as the requirement that a transaction be signed by two keys
instead of one, the Ethereum blockchain can be seen as a
Fig. 1 Current process and cost
structure of KYC
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Turing complete virtual machine that can run code in
several programming languages and therefore run the smart
contracts stored in it (see Glaser 2017).
Glaser (2017) provides a solid ontological development
of blockchain systems concepts and defines a common set
of blockchain components and relationships. This analysis
serves as a framework and basis for assessing the impli-
cations of blockchain solutions in an academic or economic
context. Further, it introduces the perspective of a perva-
sive decentralization of multiple layers of digital infras-
tructure by blockchain technology. Specifically, Glaser
(2017) defines and describes two layers of code – namely,
the fabric layer and the application layer. The term fabric
layer denotes the system’s code base, which embraces
communication, the public-key infrastructure, the software
that constructs and maintains the database, and the exe-
cution environment of the system. Whoever develops and
maintains the fabric layer controls the functioning of the
system. Ultimately, the fabric layer defines the governance
type of the system, which can be the only dimension of the
fabric layer, and that can be public, permissioned, or
hybrid. Nevertheless, and as described by Glaser (2017),
one important characteristic of blockchain systems is that
they do not allow for a differentiation between users and
user management modules, which implies that all the users
have complete transparency when reading the transactions
and the smart contract code deployed.
The application layer comprises the application logic of
the services implemented in the form of smart contracts.
The application layer encompasses three dimensions –
namely, the ecosystem closedness, the value linking, and
the market type. The closedness of the ecosystem refers to
the extent to which the system needs to interact with other
structures that are outside of the blockchain-based frame-
work – that is, with other trusted interfaces. Since the
decentralization of control ends at the boundaries of the
blockchain-based system, the more closed the system is,
the higher the leverage of a blockchain-based solution. The
value linking of the system refers to the intrinsic value of
the tokens that are exchanged between parties within the
system. Glaser (2017) suggests four possible ways in which
value is assigned to the tokens of a system – namely, being
the token a community currency, being seen as debt or
equity by the participants of the system, being backed by a
commercial bank, or being backed by a central bank. The
last dimension of the application layer is market type,
which describes the nature of the market in which the
blockchain-based solution is framed.
The European Security and Markets Authority (2016)
sets out the possible benefits of DLT applied to securities
markets, discusses the possible shortcomings of and chal-
lenges to those benefits, and analyzes the relevant regula-
tory framework, with a focus on the main EU legislation
relevant to potential applications of DLT in securities
markets. While the Authority focuses on the securities
market, it provides a DLT-solutions governance framework
that can be very similar to the governance framework
required by the solution proposed in this paper. Specifi-
cally, it suggests that for the interbank context of securities
markets, a permission-based system can be of great value.
Further, the Authority claims that such a system would
allow for governance of the interaction between the sys-
tem’s participants, paying special attention to the liabilities
of each participant, correction mechanisms, and even
penalties in the case of infringement of the rules.
The European Central Bank (2012) defines and classifies
virtual currency schemes based on their observed charac-
teristics. Depending on the interaction of the virtual cur-
rency schemes with traditional money and the real
economy, the Bank classifies them into three types: Type 1,
which refers to closed virtual currency schemes, which
operate in the same way as do virtual currencies used in
online gaming; Type 2, virtual currency schemes with a
unidirectional flow (usually an inflow), meaning that there
exists a conversion rate for purchasing the virtual currency;
and Type 3, virtual currency schemes that have bidirec-
tional flows.
The World Economic Forum (2016) analyzes the current
phase of the disruptive innovation work that is being
conducted in terms of DLT in the financial sector, first
looking at how blockchain can reshape financial services,
and then studying the role of financial institutions in
building digital identity. The Forum (2016) concludes that
DLT can enable the design of new systems or improve
existing ones, by automating processes, reducing settle-
ment time, reducing costs, reducing operational risk, pro-
viding central authority disintermediation, and offering
real-time settlement.
Egelund-Mu¨ller et al. (2017) look into the construction
of an automated financial system, with multiple counter-
parties, that can run a variety of complex financial
derivatives, including settlement, directly on DLT.
4 Design Science for KYC Optimization
According to Hevner et al. (2004, p. 77), the objective of
design science research (DSR) is to produce a technology
based solution – in the form of a viable artifact – that
solves a relevant business problem. In the context of a
hackathon organized at the IT University of Copenhagen,
we collaborated with the Nordic financial services group
Nordea Bank AB to study the inefficiencies and costs
related to the KYC process, and analyzed if this process
could be improved by means of a DLT-based solution.
During these four days we were confronted with the
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aforementioned reality of KYC inefficiencies, and trans-
formed the existing problematic into the following research
question:
‘‘Can a DLT-based solution reduce the cost of the KYC
process for financial institutions and improve the cus-
tomer’s experience?’’
In order to answer the research question and to design an
effective artifact that solves the problem at hand within the
corporate and regulatory context, we followed Hevner
et al. (2004)’s DSR approach and focused on its three
components (environment, IS research, and knowledge
base). To strengthen the utility, quality, and efficacy of the
proposed solution, we also considered the DSR process
based on Peffers et al. (2007)’s approach, which synthe-
sizes design science processes from Information Systems
(IS) and other disciplines. This process is subdivided into
five sub-steps: problem identification, objective definition,
design and refinement of the artifact, demonstration of the
artifact, and evaluation of the artifact. The last three steps
of the process need to be repeated recursively in a loop in
order to gather feedback from the environment and to
refine the artifact according to that feedback. Both the
approach and the process are summarized in Fig. 2.
Nordea Bank AB, representing the corporate environ-
ment, expressed the need for improvement in the KYC
process. They provided us with information concerning the
applied difficulties of conducting the process and pointed
out its main pain sources. This enabled us to identify the
problem and define our objective (previously formulated in
the form of our research question): use a DLT-based
solution to reduce the cost of the KYC process for financial
institutions and improve the customer’s experience. In
order to better understand the environment, we researched
the existing KYC literature, paying special attention to
efforts made in recent years to homogenize the KYC pro-
cess and increase its efficiency without compromising
security. Further, we held various exchanges with experts
in the field (lawyers, practitioners, and experts) regarding
best practices in KYC. During these exchanges, it became
clear that the system proposed would need to fulfill three
conditions if it was to be accepted by the participants. First,
it would need to enable its users to obtain a tamper-proof
record of the KYC process in the case of conflict. Second,
it would have to reduce the costs of the current KYC
process and distribute the remaining costs in a propor-
tionate manner among the participants of the system. Third,
the system would need to not compromise the responsi-
bility of banks with regard to conducting the KYC process.
The combination of the environment’s needs and our
knowledge base constituted the grounds for our IS
research, which yielded the first version of our artifact, a
version that we continued to refine over several months
based on ongoing dialog with, and feedback on the artifact
from, KYC practitioners. With the problem identified and
our objective defined (see above), the first design and
refinement phase of the artifact was conducted, taking into
account the feedback and validation of KYC practitioners,
as well as the insights with regard to DLT from our
knowledge base and the KYC experience from the envi-
ronment. The first demonstration of the artifact took place
during the Nordic Blockchain Summit, at which it was
awarded first prize, receiving the majority of the votes of
an audience of over 300 practitioners from the senior
corporate management level. The first evaluation phase
involved various informal working sessions with KYC
practitioners who studied the artifact in terms of its rele-
vance and viability, which helped us to learn more about
the specific requirements of the participants.
Fig. 2 DSR approach and DSR process. Source: Authors’ own illustration adapted from Hevner et al. (2004) and Peffers et al. (2007)
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After the first design, refinement, demonstration, and
evaluation phases, we undertook a second loop of refine-
ment, demonstration, and evaluation, following the DSR
process described in Fig. 2. The second loop incorporated
the feedback of five senior executives from the banking
sector, a lawyer, and two senior government officials, with
whom we conducted several working sessions to explore
various implementation possibilities of the solution here
proposed. Their feedback was related to the need for
interbank collaboration and for cooperation with the
national regulator, as well as the need to launch the process
in a single, relatively small country (that can amend the
required regulations efficiently and quickly), to ensure that
the system functions correctly. This feedback round made
us aware of the need to initially propose the solution at a
national level, moving on to a solution that would
encompass a range of countries only later. From these
working sessions, we also learned about the central role of
the national regulator as the cornerstone of such a DLT-
based solution, about the need to identify the individuals
involved at each step of the KYC approval process, and
about the importance of keeping all the documents of a
specific customer on a secure local storage facility with
only the hashes of each document stored on the DLT (in
order to facilitate the tracing of past activity while ensuring
that banks still know their customers and can effectively
protect customer privacy with regard to cyber attacks).
These points were influential in our decision to assign to
the national regulator the role of maintaining the system.
5 The Redefined KYC Process
The IS suggested in this paper to solve the current ineffi-
ciencies of the KYC process relies on the following three
assumptions: First, a group of financial institutions, work-
ing in the same country and therefore obliged to respect the
same KYC regulations, agrees on the standards for granting
core KYC verification to a customer. Second, all the
financial institutions that collaborate in the system agree on
the average costs of conducting a core KYC verification
process. This cost might of course depend on the com-
plexity of each individual customer, based on predeter-
mined parameters (e.g., client size, volume of documents
exchanged, etc.). Third, the national regulator maintains
the system and approves financial institutions to work with
the system in order to conduct a more efficient and trans-
parent KYC verification process. These three assumptions
are necessary to ensure a correct incentive structure across
the participating financial institutions.
Further, we define a set of four conditions that must be
fulfilled by the artifact. It must ensure the proportional
sharing of the cost of conducting the core KYC verification
process; maintain the privacy standards of the KYC process
as they are today; ensure that no institution can claim
compensation without conducting that core process; and
ensure that no institution can become a free rider and avoid
paying for using the information generated by other
member institutions. The proportionality condition ensures
that the costs are shared proportionally. The irrelevance
condition ensures that the financial institution that conducts
the core KYC verification process does not have an
incentive to prefer that another institution conducts the core
KYC verification process and vice versa. The privacy
condition ensures that the financial institutions that work in
the system cannot know with which other financial insti-
tutions the customer is working, unless the customer
reveals that information (privacy is required among finan-
cial institutions). The no-minting condition ensures that no
financial institution can simulate having conducted a core
KYC verification process in order to be compensated by
other institutions for work that it has not done. These
conditions are summarized in Table 1.
The suggested artifact is composed of two parts. The
first part is a permissioned database that stores the docu-
ments that require a certain privacy. The second part is a
distributed ledger that serves as an immutable record and
clearing system via which to proportionally distribute the
costs of the KYC process among the participating institu-
tions. The system is held and managed by the regulator,
who enables the database and the DLT infrastructure. This
implies that the national regulator develops and maintains
the fabric layer and therefore plays a central role in the
system. The clearing itself, however, is conducted via the
smart contract, which comes along with very low clearing
costs for this solution. The artifact works as follows.
1. A number k 3 of financial institutions and the
national regulator agree to interact with the artifact
and set the average price m of conducting a core KYC
verification process. The regulator establishes a digital
currency with a fixed exchange rate against the
national currency. This automatically assigns value to
the token used in the system. In terms of the
abovementioned European Central Bank (2012) clas-
sification, this system would be framed as a Type 3
virtual currency scheme. Each financial institution can
purchase digital currency in exchange for national
Table 1 Conditions for ensuring the viability of the system
Name Description
Proportionality Proportional cost sharing
Irrelevance No incentive to avoid KYC
Privacy Privacy is guaranteed
No-minting No false claims can be made
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currency, such that it can later on compensate other
member financial institutions for the verifications that
they conduct. The purchased digital currency can be
distributed across as many different accounts as each
financial institution desires. Since the system is run by
the regulator, no financial institution can know to
which financial institutions the other accounts belong.
Only the regulator is aware, with certainty, of the
activities of each financial institution.
2. Whenever customers approach a member financial
institution to be validated in terms of KYC for the first
time, they are granted a new account (with a public and
a private key) through the systems interface. For the
sake of brevity, we refer to the first financial institution
that conducts the core KYC verification for a customer
as the ‘‘home bank’’. Once customers have been
granted an account in the system, they can share with
the home bank their public key and the documents that
must be analyzed. The exchange of these documents
occurs outside of the distributed ledger to protect the
privacy of the customer. The home bank will keep
these documents in its local database. Once the bank
decides to validate or reject a customer, it stores a
digitally signed document in the smart contract of this
customer and this includes the result of the core KYC
verification process (verified or rejected). Additionally,
the hash of each of the documents submitted by the
customer, documents that have been used for the
verification, is also stored by the home bank on the
distributed ledger. Once the validation has been
conducted, the home bank creates a ‘‘document
package’’ for the customer, which contains the docu-
ments submitted by the customer and that have
previously been hashed, as well as the digitally signed
document that summarizes the KYC verification
process and includes the result of the core KYC
verification. This document package is stored in the
bank’s local database as well as in the permissioned
database managed by the regulator. At this stage, only
the customer and the home bank have the documents
package. Further, the home bank creates a smart
contract for this customer, a contract that contains a list
of the public keys of the wallets of the financial
institutions that have checked that the status of this
customer in terms of KYC has been verified and that
have paid their corresponding fraction of the verifica-
tion costs. We call this list the ‘‘list of onboarding
institutions’’. At the time of its creation, when a
customer only works with the home bank, the list of
onboarding institutions only contains the public key of
the account that the home bank has used to interact
with this customer. This list can later be enlarged as
the customer interacts with further institutions. We
suggest that each bank uses a single, unique, one-
payment-only account to interact with each customer,
since this will later on protect the privacy of financial
institutions and customers.
3. Whenever customers approach an institution other than
the home bank with the intention of working with it,
they can share with it their public key and key and the
address of the original smart contract in which the
home bank wrote the result of the core KYC verifi-
cation process. Further, they can grant this institution
access in the permissioned database to the documents
package previously created by the home bank, such
that it too can read them and validate the customer.
Further, by reading the smart contract, the new
financial institution can see how many institutions
have worked with the customer so far, since it can see
how many public keys appear in the list of onboarding
institutions. To be added to this list, a financial
institution has to pay the proportional part of the
average price m of conducting a core KYC verification
process. Specifically, this institution has to pay m
k
to the
smart contract. Note that k  1 is the number of
institutions that have worked with this customer so far
(i.e., k  1 is the number of institutions that are listed
in the list of onboarding institutions). The smart
contract then sends the compensation that it has
received, divided into equal parts between the k  1
institutions that had previously worked with this
customer, and adds the public key of the account from
which it has received the payment to the list of
onboarding institutions. The payment is made in the
cryptocurrency issued by the regulator.
4. This mechanism ensures that all the financial institu-
tions that work with one given customer share the costs
of the core KYC verification process proportionally;
that is to say, if the k-th institution that starts working
with a customer always contributes with m
k
and this
contribution is distributed in equal parts among the
accounts of the other k  1 institutions, all the
institutions that work with the customer end up paying
the same fraction of the average price m of conducting
a core KYC verification process. It is easy to see that
for k ¼ 1 only the home bank works with the customer
and that it bears the full average cost m of conducting a
core KYC verification process, since no other institu-
tion is compensating it for the work conducted, which
is worth m. For the case in which k ¼ 2, the second
financial institution to join pays m
2
to the smart contract,
which automatically sends this compensation to the
home bank, such that both institutions bear a cost equal
to m
2
. Let us assume now that this system works for a
number k 2, such that the k-th institution pays m
k
. So
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far, each of the other k  1 institutions has paid mðk1Þ
and now receives an amount equal to m
kðk1Þ from the
last institution to join. Hence, the cost for each
institution equals m
k1 mkðk1Þ ¼ mk .
The smart contract contains the documents’ hash codes, the
public key of the home bank, the certificate of approval,
which conveys that the customer has been validated, and an
array called ‘‘onboarded’’ with all the public keys of the
financial institutions that have paid the proportional com-
pensation amount to the home bank.
This system ensures that the core KYC process only has
to be undertaken once, by the first institution with which a
customer intends to work, but that its result can be used by
as many financial institutions as required by the customer.
This specific setting shows how, for a customer that works
with k financial institutions, the exchange of documents
and core KYC verification need only be undertaken once
(and not k times as is the case in the current setting).
Furthermore, the total cost of conducting the core KYC
verification for one customer is now the cost m of one
single KYC (and not k  m, as in the current practice).
Figure 3 illustrates the same example case as that pre-
sented in Fig. 1, but this time following the introduction of
the proposed system. The system enables the same cus-
tomer to work with the same three financial institutions, but
now the exchange of documents and the core KYC veri-
fication process only occur once and the costs are reduced
to a third.
This system fulfills the four previously defined condi-
tions: proportionality, irrelevance, privacy, and no minting.
With regard to privacy, since each financial institution only
uses one account for each customer, and it is therefore not
possible to identify which institution is behind which
public key, privacy, for customers and financial institu-
tions, is ensured. Only if one customer would work with all
the institutions in the system would all the institutions be
able to infer that this was the case. However, since financial
institutions use only one account per customer, their pri-
vacy would still be guaranteed with regard to the rest of the
customers. The no-minting condition is fulfilled, since only
by paying can an institution be added to the onboarding
institutions list of a customer that approaches it. Since the
action of compensating other institutions for the core KYC
verification process that has been conducted can only be
triggered by a real customer approaching an institution, no
institution has an incentive to fake smart contracts claiming
that it has conducted a core KYC verification process, since
in such a case there would exist no genuine customer
behind such a process that would subsequently approach
another institution and ask to be verified.
6 Implementing the Redefined KYC Solution
In this section we discuss the implementation considera-
tions of the DLT-based KYC solution previously descri-
bed. It is important to note that the implementation of such
a system would have significant implications for the
financial sector and that it would therefore need to be
carried out in close coordination with the regulator. Fur-
ther, many of the dimensions of the system would depend
on specific national guidelines and legislation. Hence, in
this section we discuss both the suggested system and two
variations on it that offer different degrees of centralization
and thus make possible its implementation. We also discuss
alternative designs and look into the challenges and bene-
fits of those designs.
6.1 Design of a KYC Solution
The system proposed in Fig. 4 explains the new KYC
process using the example of a customer that approaches
two financial institutions. In a first step, the customer
approaches the home bank and provides the required KYC
documents for verification. The home bank uses the
Fig. 3 Proposed work flow and
cost structure of KYC after the
implementation of the artifact
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system’s application (which is installed at each of the
participating documents onbanks) to handle the process of
document exchange with the customer outside of the dis-
tributed ledger and to store these documents in its local
database. When any document is processed by the home
bank, the hash of the document is stored on the distributed
ledger. Once the home bank has validated the customer, it
can create the abovementioned document package, which
contains all the documents that have been used (and pre-
viously hashed) to grant the verification status, as well as
the digitally signed document that grants verification to this
customer. Later on, the customer can provide access to this
document package to any other institution with which it
intends to work. Hence, the next institution that needs to
validate this customer in terms of KYC can use the local
client application and communicate with the smart contract
of the customer in order to obtain the customer’s status,
inscribe itself in the list of onboarding institutions, and
handle the necessary payment over the blockchain as
described in the previous section. Further, since this insti-
tution has been granted access to the document package by
the customer, it can store a copy of it locally on its own
database.
In the proposed solution, the regulator is assigned a
central role as a trusted third party (TTP) and owner of the
‘‘fabric layer’’. This could represent a possible shortcoming
of the system if – for example – the regulator were corrupt,
or compromised by hacking or by insider fraud. This is
indeed an aspect that can be further analyzed in the future.
In order to mitigate this potential shortcoming to a certain
extent, the TTP characteristics described by Lee et al.
(2016) could be incorporated.
Fig. 4 Design of the KYC
solution
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6.2 Decentralized KYC Solution
The solution proposed in the previous subsection can be
further decentralized with the following modifications.
First, if the DLT part of the solution were implemented
directly on the Ethereum network rather than using a pri-
vate blockchain, any attempt to change the information on
the blockchain would be made more difficult due to the
existence of a large mining community that is harder to
corrupt. Second, the regulator could be removed from the
system, thus precluding the risk of there being a party that
has an unlimited view of the system. Last, some further
efficiency could be introduced by storing the data only at
the financial institution that has actually approved the
customer. This solution is shown in Fig. 5. While we
acknowledge these benefits, our discussions with experts
indicate that in most Western countries the risk of a corrupt
regulator is considered low when weighed against the
benefit of the higher financial stability that would result
from the regulator’s ability to easily and routinely check
the KYC process. Furthermore, storing the documents
locally ensures that any bank that works with a client
would check of the KYC documents whenever it wished. In
our proposed design we have used a private distributed
ledger and not a public one. This decision was based on the
feedback received from the finance executives consulted
during the DSR process, who stated that banks would not
be comfortable having customers’ private information
available on a public distributed ledger (even if only hash
code values of documents and the key to decrypt the cus-
tomer document package were to be kept on a public led-
ger). This is understandable, as potential bugs in the smart
contract or reverse engineering of the smart contract
bytecode could lead to the risk of exposing information
unintentionally. Luu et al. (2016) scan 19,366 smart con-
tracts on Ethereum and find vulnerabilities in 8833 of them.
The stated concerns of the finance executives consulted are,
then, well grounded. Further, the whole compensation
Fig. 5 Design of the distributed
KYC system. The blockchain is
public, the documents are only
kept by the home bank and the
regulator does not have
privileged access
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scheme that enables the cost reduction and cost sharing
within the system is only possible thanks to the use of DLT.
A more mature DLT would allow for a ledger in which
stored documents can be held completely privately. This
would make possible a decentralized, permissioned data-
base held on a blockchain. In such a system, the document
package would only be stored on a distributed ledger, and
not on a central database managed by the regulator. The
projects R3 Corda and Hyperledger are moving in this
direction. While these projects are not mature enough
currently, they may well be in the near future.
6.3 Centralized KYC Solution
It is possible to benefit from cost sharing during the KYC
process by using a different, fully centralized KYC artifact.
This would require only one party being allowed to
approve or reject customers. One such centralized solution
would be to transfer the entire KYC responsibility to one
specialized entity or a regulator-operated KYC office. In
such a design, the customer would need to be authorized by
the entity and, subsequently, each bank that wanted to work
with that customer would obtain a permission to do so from
Fig. 6 Design of the centralized KYC system
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the centralized authority. This solution is shown in Fig. 6,
and while it is unlikely to be adopted as it creates an
additional cost for the regulator and in essence frees banks
from the responsibility of knowing their customers, there
are some significant benefits to be gained from such a
solution. The main benefit is that by removing the costs of
KYC from banks (and other financial institutions) we
reduce significantly the cost of forming a new financial
entity and, in this way, open the market up to increased
competition. Furthermore, this reduction in costs for banks
would lead to lower fees for customers and lower costs for
doing business in a given country. That in turn would
benefit a country that uses a centralized KYC solution as
that country would be perceived as being open for business
and competitive without necessarily compromising AML
or KYC requirements.
6.4 The Use of Distributed Ledger Technology
Having presented a solution, it is worth considering why
the use of DLT represents an improvement compared to
other possible technologies. First, there would be
improvements in terms of auditing and tracking. This is
advantageous for the national regulator since it provides a
clear record of the information that financial institutions
verify prior to the opening of accounts, and could serve as a
single point of truth should disagreement occur. And the
immutable nature of the record created by DLT-based
solutions cannot be matched by other technologies. Sec-
ond, the proposed system allows collaboration between
financial institutions that do not necessary trust one
another. Specifically, given that financial institutions
compete for customers’ assets and accounts, only a system
that allows for anonymous collaboration – such as anony-
mous compensation and anonymous document sharing –
would gain the support of financial institutions. Third, one
of the major contributions of the solution proposed here is
that an institution can be anonymously and proportionately
compensated by others for the efforts conducted to verify a
customer. This is only possible due to the features of the
distributed ledger, which allow institutions to communicate
with one another without revealing their identities but
ensure that each institution abides by all relevant regula-
tions at all times. Fourth, it is important to note that the
system proposed here – irrespective of the technology used
to enable it – is, in essence, a system for interbank col-
laboration. Since financial institutions are studying broader
interbank collaborations based on DLT – such as the R3
project – it seems logical to propose a system such as the
one presented here, which already takes core DLT features
into account, such that it can, in the future, be integrated
into a broader DLT-based framework. Last, and taking into
account that such a novel system would in any case need a
clearing instance to settle the compensations, DLT elimi-
nates high central authority fees. All in all, the solution
proposed here from DLT for the following reasons: the
application of this technology allows for the automation of
a process, increases the information available if a dispute
should occur, reduces settlement time compared to other
technologies, and reduces business costs.
7 Conclusion
This paper has suggested an IS to reduce the aggregated
cost of KYC in a jurisdiction by means of DLT. The main
efficiency gain that this IS proposes is the avoidance of the
same tasks being duplicated by different financial institu-
tions. Additionally, this paper has shown how it is possible
to distribute the costs of the core KYC verification process
proportionally among those financial institutions, solutions
that require the verification process be carried out for one
given customer, and has defined a series of conditions that
the IS in question needs to fulfill in order to ensure the
correct incentive structure for the participating institutions.
The maximum total cost saving per customer generated by
the proposed IS can be measured as
P
i mi  ðki  1Þ,
where mi is the cost of conducting a full core KYC veri-
fication for a customer i, and ki is the number of financial
institutions that conduct business with customer i. This
implies that the monetary savings brought about by the
proposed IS and the increased efficiency that it would
deliver for both customers and institutions are significantly
affected by the number of financial institutions that par-
ticipate in the system. The proposed IS has emerged from
the application of design science research to the problems
of high costs for financial institutions and the low satis-
faction of customers when conducting a core KYC verifi-
cation process. The fact that the smart contracts in which
the information is stored would be owned by the customers
and not by the participating institutions already addresses
the paradigm shift taking place with regard to consumer
data in light of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), which will come into force in 2018 (European
Commission 2016). For example, a simple extension of the
system could oblige the client application running at each
bank to regularly check in order to detect if a customer has
decided to no longer work with the bank and ensure that
customer’s private documents are deleted. Performing a
core KYC verification process on a distributed ledger has
many intersections with ongoing research in the area of
digital identity in distributed ledgers. One question that
arises here is that of the location in which customers’
sensitive documents would be stored. In the proposed IS,
all the information is stored locally by each bank, as well as
in a permissioned database maintained by the regulator.
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This is primarily due to the high cost of storage on the
Ethereum platform on which the artifact was first designed.
It is possible to conduct other designs based on permis-
sioned, contractually based solutions such as R3CEV’s
Corda or Monetas, both of which are currently generating a
lot of interest. Corda and the Ethereum blockchain have
similarities, but the former is – in its essence – the com-
bination of a distributed database and a Java Virtual
Machine, enabling parties on the network to execute
bilateral transactions involving sensitive information that is
not revealed to the public. These kinds of solutions could
offer new approaches to providing distributed but private
document exchange between customers and financial
institutions that include storage possibilities for larger
documents. However, solutions such as Corda are still in
their early stages of development and privacy with regard
to the customer data that is shared in such a system is a
concern that needs to be thoroughly addressed.
Regardless of the chosen approach to using DLT, be it a
distributed database or a private, restricted, or public
blockchain, our research suggests many opportunities to
increase efficiency in the financial system.More specifically,
a significant reduction in costs for the participating institu-
tions and an improved experience for customers could both
be delivered by such a system. Furthermore, the system
would – thanks to the decreased regulatory costs of KYC –
lower the barriers to operating a financial institution, thus
opening the financial market up to further competition.
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